Commit Graph

8 Commits (fa1c24d14baf903c549fdb4f30a55b115eccad7d)

Author SHA1 Message Date
Michael Brown 486b15b3c1 [crypto] Support decryption of images via CMS envelopes
Add support for decrypting images containing detached encrypted data
using a cipher key obtained from a separate CMS envelope image (in DER
or PEM format).

Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
2024-08-29 14:47:13 +01:00
Michael Brown bdb5b4aef4 [crypto] Hold CMS message as a single ASN.1 object
Reduce the number of dynamic allocations required to parse a CMS
message by retaining the ASN.1 cursor returned from image_asn1() for
the lifetime of the CMS message.  This allows embedded ASN.1 cursors
to be used for parsed objects within the message, such as embedded
signatures.

Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
2024-08-23 13:43:42 +01:00
Michael Brown 97635eb71b [crypto] Generalise cms_signature to cms_message
There is some exploitable similarity between the data structures used
for representing CMS signatures and CMS encryption keys.  In both
cases, the CMS message fundamentally encodes a list of participants
(either message signers or message recipients), where each participant
has an associated certificate and an opaque octet string representing
the signature or encrypted cipher key.  The ASN.1 structures are not
identical, but are sufficiently similar to be worth exploiting: for
example, the SignerIdentifier and RecipientIdentifier data structures
are defined identically.

Rename data structures and functions, and add the concept of a CMS
message type.

Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
2024-08-14 13:04:01 +01:00
Michael Brown 3b4d0cb555 [crypto] Pass image as parameter to CMS functions
The cms_signature() and cms_verify() functions currently accept raw
data pointers.  This will not be possible for cms_decrypt(), which
will need the ability to extract fragments of ASN.1 data from a
potentially large image.

Change cms_signature() and cms_verify() to accept an image as an input
parameter, and move the responsibility for setting the image trust
flag within cms_verify() since that now becomes a more natural fit.

Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
2024-08-13 12:30:51 +01:00
Michael Brown b6ee89ffb5 [legal] Relicense files under GPL2_OR_LATER_OR_UBDL
Relicense files for which I am the sole author (as identified by
util/relicense.pl).

Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
2015-03-02 14:17:31 +00:00
Michael Brown bc8ca6b8ce [crypto] Generalise X.509 cache to a full certificate store
Expand the concept of the X.509 cache to provide the functionality of
a certificate store.  Certificates in the store will be automatically
used to complete certificate chains where applicable.

The certificate store may be prepopulated at build time using the
CERT=... build command line option.  For example:

  make bin/ipxe.usb CERT=mycert1.crt,mycert2.crt

Certificates within the certificate store are not implicitly trusted;
the trust list is specified using TRUST=... as before.  For example:

  make bin/ipxe.usb CERT=root.crt TRUST=root.crt

This can be used to embed the full trusted root certificate within the
iPXE binary, which is potentially useful in an HTTPS-only environment
in which there is no HTTP server from which to automatically download
cross-signed certificates or other certificate chain fragments.

This usage of CERT= extends the existing use of CERT= to specify the
client certificate.  The client certificate is now identified
automatically by checking for a match against the private key.  For
example:

  make bin/ipxe.usb CERT=root.crt,client.crt TRUST=root.crt KEY=client.key

Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
2014-03-28 17:09:40 +00:00
Michael Brown 557f467bab [crypto] Allow certificate chains to be long-lived data structures
At present, certificate chain validation is treated as an
instantaneous process that can be carried out using only data that is
already in memory.  This model does not allow for validation to
include non-instantaneous steps, such as downloading a cross-signing
certificate, or determining certificate revocation status via OCSP.

Redesign the internal representation of certificate chains to allow
chains to outlive the scope of the original source of certificates
(such as a TLS Certificate record).

Allow for certificates to be cached, so that each certificate needs to
be validated only once.

Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
2012-05-04 17:54:31 +01:00
Michael Brown bdb69d587e [crypto] Add support for Cryptographic Message Syntax (PKCS #7)
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (PKCS#7) provides a format for
encapsulating digital signatures of arbitrary binary blobs.  A
signature can be generated using

  openssl cms -sign -in <file to sign> -binary -noattr \
  	  -signer <signer>.crt -inkey <signer>.key -certfile <CA>.crt \
	  -outform DER -out <signature>

Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
2012-03-22 11:41:23 +00:00