The domain etherboot.org was actually registered on 2000-01-09, not
2000-09-01. (To put it another way, it was registered on 1/9/2000 (US
date format) rather than 1/9/2000 (sensible date format); this may
illuminate the cause of the error.)
"iqn.2000-09.org.etherboot:" is still valid as per RFC3720, but may be
surprising to users, so change it to something less unexpected.
Thanks to the anonymous contributor for pointing this one out.
When an error reply (not 1xx, 2xx or 3xx) was received, ftp_reply()
invoked ftp_done() to close connections, but did not return, and the
rest of code in this function could try to send commands to the closed
control connection.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Vlasov <vsu@altlinux.ru>
Based on a patch contributed by Sergey Vlasov <vsu@altlinux.ru> :
In my testing with "qemu -net user" the 226 response to RETR was
often received earlier than final packets of the data connection;
this caused the received file to become truncated without any error
indication. Fix this by adding an intermediate state FTP_TRANSFER
between FTP_RETR and FTP_QUIT, so that the transfer is considered to
be complete only when both the end of data connection is encountered
and the final reply to the RETR command is received.
Return the most appropriate of EACCES, EPERM, ENODEV, ENOTSUP, EIO or
EINVAL depending on the exact error returned by the target, rather than
just always returning EPERM.
Also, ensure that error strings exist for these errors.
Some EMC targets will fail if we advertise that we can authenticate with
CHAP, but the target is configured to allow unauthenticated access to that
target. We advertise AuthMethod=CHAP,None; the target should (I think)
select AuthMethod=None for unprotected targets. IETD does this, but an
EMC Celerra NS83 doesn't.
Fix by offering only AuthMethod=None if the user hasn't supplied a
username and password; this means that we won't be offering CHAP
authentication unless the user is expecting to use it (in which case the
target is presumably configured appropriately).
Many thanks to Alessandro Iurlano <alessandro.iurlano@gmail.com> for
reporting and helping to diagnose this problem.
gPXE is not compliant with the HTTP/1.1 specification (RFC 2616),
since it lacks support for "Transfer-Encoding: chunked". gPXE is,
however, compliant with the HTTP/1.0 specification (RFC 1945), which
does not require "Transfer-Encoding: chunked" to be supported.
The only HTTP/1.1 feature that gPXE uses is the "Host:" header, but
servers universally accept that one from HTTP/1.0 clients as an
optional extension (it is obligatory for HTTP/1.1). gPXE does not,
for example, appear to support connection caching. Advertising as a
HTTP/1.0 client will typically make the server close the connection
immediately upon sending the last data, which is actually beneficial
if we aren't going to keep the connection alive anyway.
Allow for settings to be described by something other than a DHCP option
tag if desirable. Currently used only for the MAC address setting.
Separate out fake DHCP packet creation code from dhcp.c to fakedhcp.c.
Remove notion of settings from dhcppkt.c.
Rationalise dhcp.c to use settings API only for final registration of the
DHCP options, rather than using {store,fetch}_setting throughout.
Allow port numbers in iSCSI redirection.
Wait for SCSI status, not just the final data-in (which may be followed
by an explicit SCSI Response PDU if the S bit is not set).
We didn't specify values for MaxRecvDataSegmentLength and
MaxBurstLength (to save space, since we were happy with the
RFC-defined default values of 8kB and 256kB respectively). However,
the OpenSolaris target (incorrectly) assumes default values of zero
for these parameters.
The upshot was that the OpenSolaris target would get stuck in an
endless loop trying to send us the first 512-byte sector, zero bytes
at a time, and would eventually run out of memory and core-dump.
Fixed by explicitly specifying the default values for these two
parameters.
Michael Brown
Sergey Vlasov
H. Peter Anvin
Holger Lubitz