Record the root of trust used at the point that a certificate is
validated, redefine validation as checking a certificate against a
specific root of trust, and pass an explicit root of trust when
creating a TLS connection.
This allows a custom TLS connection to be used with a custom root of
trust, without causing any validated certificates to be treated as
valid for normal purposes.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Use the existing certificate store to automatically append any
available issuing certificates to the selected client certificate.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Restructure the use of add_tls() to insert a TLS filter onto an
existing interface. This allows for the possibility of using
add_tls() to start TLS on an existing connection (as used in several
protocols which will negotiate the choice to use TLS before the
ClientHello is sent).
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
The supported ciphers and digest algorithms may already be specified
via config/crypto.h. Extend this to allow a minimum TLS protocol
version to be specified.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
The restart of negotiation triggered by a HelloRequest currently does
not call tls_tx_resume() and so may end up leaving the connection in
an idle state in which the pending ClientHello is never sent.
Fix by calling tls_tx_resume() as part of tls_restart(), since the
call to tls_tx_resume() logically belongs alongside the code that sets
bits in tls->tx_pending.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
TLS connections will almost always create background connections to
perform cross-signed certificate downloads and OCSP checks. There is
currently no direct visibility into which checks are taking place,
which makes troubleshooting difficult in the absence of either a
packet capture or a debug build.
Use the job progress message buffer to report the current cross-signed
certificate download or OCSP status check, where applicable.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Record the session ID (if any) provided by the server and attempt to
reuse it for any concurrent connections to the same server.
If multiple connections are initiated concurrently (e.g. when using
PeerDist) then defer sending the ClientHello for all but the first
connection, to allow time for the first connection to potentially
obtain a session ID (and thereby speed up the negotiation for all
remaining connections).
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
The cipherstream xfer_window_changed() message is used to retrigger
the TLS transmit state machine. If the transmit state machine is
idle, then the window change message will not be propagated to the
plainstream interface. This can potentially cause the plainstream
interface peer (e.g. httpcore) to block waiting for a window change
message that will never arrive.
Fix by ensuring that the window change message is propagated to the
plainstream interface if the transmit state machine is idle. (If the
transmit state machine is not idle then the plainstream window will be
zero anyway.)
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
In TLS terminology a session conceptually spans multiple individual
connections, and essentially represents the stored cryptographic state
(master secret and cipher suite) required to establish communication
without going through the certificate and key exchange handshakes.
Rename tls_session to tls_connection in order to make the name
tls_session available to represent the session state.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
A failure in tls_generate_random() will result in a call to ref_put()
before the received data list has been initialised, which will cause
free_tls() to attempt to traverse an uninitialised list.
Fix by ensuring that all fields referenced by free_tls() are
initialised before any of the potential failure paths.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Support renegotiation with servers supporting RFC5746. This allows
for the use of per-directory client certificates.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
When performing a SAN boot, the plainstream window size will be zero
(since this is the mechanism used internally to indicate that no data
should be fetched via the initial request). This zero value currently
propagates to the advertised TCP window size, which prevents the TLS
negotiation from completing.
Fix by ensuring that the cipherstream window is held open until TLS
negotiation is complete, and only then falling back to passing through
the plainstream window size.
Reported-by: John Wigley <johnwigley#ipxe@acorna.co.uk>
Tested-by: John Wigley <johnwigley#ipxe@acorna.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Many TLS records contain variable-length fields. We currently
validate the overall record length, but do so only after reading the
length of the variable-length field. If the record is too short to
even contain the length field, then we may read uninitialised data
from beyond the end of the record.
This is harmless in practice (since the subsequent overall record
length check would fail regardless of the value read from the
uninitialised length field), but causes warnings from some analysis
tools.
Fix by validating that the overall record length is sufficient to
contain the length field before reading from the length field.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Add support for SHA-224, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as digest algorithms in
X.509 certificates, and allow the choice of public-key, cipher, and
digest algorithms to be configured at build time via config/crypto.h.
Originally-implemented-by: Tufan Karadere <tufank@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
The current implementation handles big-endian 24-bit integers (which
occur in several TLS record types) by treating them as big-endian
32-bit integers which are shifted by 8 bits. This can result in
"Invalid read" errors when running under valgrind, if the 24-bit field
happens to be exactly at the end of an I/O buffer.
Fix by ensuring that we touch only the three bytes which comprise the
24-bit integer.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
This fixes "initialization discards 'const' qualifier from pointer
target type" warnings with GCC 5.1.0.
Signed-off-by: Christian Hesse <mail@eworm.de>
Modified-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Expand the concept of the X.509 cache to provide the functionality of
a certificate store. Certificates in the store will be automatically
used to complete certificate chains where applicable.
The certificate store may be prepopulated at build time using the
CERT=... build command line option. For example:
make bin/ipxe.usb CERT=mycert1.crt,mycert2.crt
Certificates within the certificate store are not implicitly trusted;
the trust list is specified using TRUST=... as before. For example:
make bin/ipxe.usb CERT=root.crt TRUST=root.crt
This can be used to embed the full trusted root certificate within the
iPXE binary, which is potentially useful in an HTTPS-only environment
in which there is no HTTP server from which to automatically download
cross-signed certificates or other certificate chain fragments.
This usage of CERT= extends the existing use of CERT= to specify the
client certificate. The client certificate is now identified
automatically by checking for a match against the private key. For
example:
make bin/ipxe.usb CERT=root.crt,client.crt TRUST=root.crt KEY=client.key
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
iPXE currently allocates a copy the certificate's common name as a
string. This string is used by the TLS and CMS code to check
certificate names against an expected name, and also appears in
debugging messages.
Provide a function x509_check_name() to centralise certificate name
checking (in preparation for adding subjectAlternativeName support),
and a function x509_name() to provide a name to be used in debugging
messages, and remove the dynamically allocated string.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Allow non-data records to be split across multiple received I/O
buffers, to accommodate large certificate chains.
Reported-by: Nicola Volpini <Nicola.Volpini@kambi.com>
Tested-by: Nicola Volpini <Nicola.Volpini@kambi.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
TLS servers are not obliged to implement the RFC3546 maximum fragment
length extension, and many common servers (including OpenSSL, as used
in Apache's mod_ssl) do not do so. iPXE may therefore have to cope
with TLS records of up to 16kB. Allocations for 16kB have a
non-negligible chance of failing, causing the TLS connection to abort.
Fix by maintaining the received record as a linked list of I/O
buffers, rather than a single contiguous buffer. To reduce memory
pressure, we also decrypt in situ, and deliver the decrypted data via
xfer_deliver_iob() rather than xfer_deliver_raw().
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
The default maximum plaintext fragment length for TLS is 16kB, which
is a substantial amount of memory for iPXE to have to allocate for a
temporary decryption buffer.
Reduce the memory footprint of TLS connections by requesting a maximum
fragment length of 2kB.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
At present, certificate chain validation is treated as an
instantaneous process that can be carried out using only data that is
already in memory. This model does not allow for validation to
include non-instantaneous steps, such as downloading a cross-signing
certificate, or determining certificate revocation status via OCSP.
Redesign the internal representation of certificate chains to allow
chains to outlive the scope of the original source of certificates
(such as a TLS Certificate record).
Allow for certificates to be cached, so that each certificate needs to
be validated only once.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
sizeof(cipherspec) is obviously wrong in this context, because it will
only zero the first 4 or 8 bytes (cipherspec is a pointer).
This problem was reported by cppcheck.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Simplify code by recording the active handshake digest algorithm as a
session parameter. (Note that we must still accumulate digests for
all supported algorithms, since we don't know which digest will
eventually be used until we receive the Server Hello.)
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
TLSv1.1 and earlier use a hybrid of MD5 and SHA-1 to generate digests
over the handshake messages. Formalise this as a separate digest
algorithm "md5+sha1".
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Validate the server certificate against the trusted root certificate
store. The server must provide a complete certificate chain, up to
and including the trusted root certificate that is embedded into iPXE.
Note that the date and time are not yet validated.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
All axTLS files are now vanilla versions of the upstream axTLS files,
with one minor exception: the unused "ctx" parameter of
bi_int_divide() has been marked with "__unused" to avoid a compilation
error.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Michael Brown
Christian Hesse
Stefan Weil